The Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) was created by Nuffield College in February, 2008. Its principal goal is to promote and facilitate experimental research by social scientists at the University of Oxford. Nuffield College has a strong commitment to promoting cross-disciplinary scholarship in the social sciences and it sees this experimental initiative as making a major contribution to this mandate.

In order to accomplish this goal the CESS has three major components: experimental lab facilities; a fellowship and post-doc programme; and regular seminars and workshops.

The Centre’s Experimental Lab facilities are located at Nuffield College. The laboratory is a state-of-the-art facility with 25 fully partitioned work-stations and a separate experimenter’s office. It is designed to support a wide range of experiments including those in which subjects are entirely separated from other participants; experiments in which subjects interact with each others; and experimental games in which subjects communicate anonymously but in real time.

The laboratory is open for use by both university staff members and other interested parties. The CESS maintains a subject pool consisting of students from the universities in the Oxford area. In addition, the Centre actively recruits non-student subjects to its pool. The CESS Lab facilities have been operational since October 2008 and access to the experimental facilities is open for use by both university staff members and other interested parties.

It is also available to the undergraduate and graduate student body at University of Oxford. The facility houses the Centre’s post-docs and research fellows. The CESS Lab is administered by Dr. Hector Solaz who is the Assistant to the Director of the CESS.
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Statement From the Director

The Nuffield College Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) completed a third year of operation. This report details the activities that the CESS has undertaken over the past year.

Experiments at Nuffield? Experimental research has experienced a significant renaissance in the social sciences - it is no longer confined to psychology but rather has been embraced by most of the other social science disciplines such as economics, anthropology, political science and sociology. Its not surprising now to find the results of this experimental research informing decision making in a broad range of areas such as the retail industry, finance, health care and government, just to name a few. For example, experiments, including experiments that measure skin conductance response and hormonal data, have been conducted on professional traders of financial instruments in order to understand the physiological basis for risk aversion. Field experiments have been conducted in rural India in order to help design insurance policies for agriculture crops. While lab experiments have been developed to assess the impact on vote choice of different race-based campaign ads. The funding and publication of experimental research has experienced significant increases in many branches of the social sciences over the past three decades. It is because of this increased interest in experimental research by social scientists that The Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) at Nuffield College was founded in 2008 with funding provided by Nuffield Governing Body for the five-year period 2008-2013.

A key focus of CESS is promoting and implementing lab experiments for the academic community in Oxford but also for researchers throughout the world who have an interest in conducting experiments at Oxford. Our experimental lab has been extremely successful. As this report points out we typically conduct about 75 experimental sessions a term – an experimental session typically lasts about 90 minutes and we usually conduct one or two sessions a day. So we are conducting on average roughly two experiments per day in any given term. This is about maximum capacity for our 25 station experimental lab. We are fortunate to have built up an impressive subject pool consisting of over 2000 Students and 1000 Non-students. Nevertheless, this volume of experiments is about the maximum the pool can accommodate.

But we do have strategies for coping with this demand for experimentation. First, we intend to expand the period during which we conduct experiments from simply term time to periods outside of the Oxford term. This has the disadvantage of there being few students available as subjects but given our growing non-student subject pool we think this is feasible.

Second, we are conducting an increasing number of virtual and online experiments that are not constrained by the physical capacity of the experimental lab. These include virtual experiments that are conducted with our subject pool with the advantage that the subjects participate remotely using their own computers - they only need to physically show up to collect their compensation. We have also conducted a number of online surveys with representative samples of the UK population - in Michaelmas 2011, we expect to conduct experiments with representative samples from the UK and France.

CESS has gained remarkable international visibility in spite of only being in existence for three years. The experimental research conducted at CESS has been funded by the major social science funding agencies in the world including the U.S. National Science Foundation, the British ESRC, the French CNRS, the Canadian SSHRC, and the European Union Framework 7.
Research teams from leading national and international institutions have conducted experiments at CESS - including LSE, University of Essex, Stanford, NYU, and CalTech.

Research conducted at CESS is beginning to make its way into some of the leading social science peer-reviewed journals. Included here are recent articles by Gill and Prowse in the *American Economics Review*, Birch and Allen in *The Political Quarterly* and *European Journal of Political Research*.

One of the major goals of the CESS initiative is to promote experimental research and provide instruction in the experimental method. This year CESS has been particularly successful with respect to our educational goal. We had another successful annual orientation session in which we invite the Oxford research community to spend an afternoon being introduced to the experimental method and to participate in an actual experiment. This year we had over 60 participants.

In cooperation with the University of Essex, CESS conducts an annual summer school in experimental methods that takes place over two weeks from June 27 to July 8. This year the course was over-subscribed - we had a total of 20 students who participated. Because of the enthusiastic demand, we are adding an additional two-week session to the summer school. CESS has also designed and is providing the instruction for an MPhil course in experimental methods that the Sociology department is offering as one of the key elements of the department’s paper in Advanced Research Methods.

CESS is particularly fortunate to have a group of smart, enthusiastic and dedicated associates. The core group, consisting of Michèle Belot, Luis Miller, Iñaki Sagarzazu, and Wojtek Przepiorka, are the reason that CESS has had such as successful three years. On that point I would like to express my appreciation for the incredible contribution that Luis Miller has made to the success of the experimental lab over the past three years. Unfortunately we are losing Luis who, this September, has taken a position at the University of the Basque Country in Bilbao - Spain. Replacing Luis is Hector Solaz from the University of Valencia. We extend a warm welcome to Hector.

Sincerely,

Raymond Duch
The People at CESS

**Raymond Duch**  CESS Director

Besides being the Director of the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) he is Professor in Quantitative Political Science at Oxford University and a Professorial Fellow at Nuffield College. Prior to assuming these positions he was the Senator Don Henderson Scholar in Political Science at the University of Houston. He received his BA (Honours) from the University of Manitoba in Canada and his MA and PhD from the University of Rochester. In addition, he has held visiting appointments at the Hoover Institute and the Graduate School of Management, Stanford University, The Institute for Social Research Oslo and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fr Sozialforschung. Professor Duch was Associate Editor of the American Journal of Political Science; recently served on the 2004 Planning Committee for the American National Election Studies; and was recently a member of the National Science Foundation Political Science Advisory Panel. He has also served as chair of the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Advisory Committee on International Issues (1999-2001). He was also one of the directors of the 2009-10 British Comparative Campaign Analysis Project and of the 2009 German Comparative Campaign Analysis Project. He is also one of the three founders of the recently formed European Political Science Association.

**Luis Miller**  Assistant to the Director of the CESS 2008-2011

Dr. Luis Miller was the Assistant to the Director of the CESS since 2008. Starting September 2011 Dr Miller will be joining the Economics Department at the University of the Basque Country. Dr. Miller has also been Visiting Scholar at the University of Essex (ECASS program) and at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (Indiana University, Bloomington). He obtained his PhD at the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (IESA-CSIC) in 2007.

Luis has been conducting laboratory-based behavioural experiments since 2005 and has already published several experimental papers on distributive justice, conventions, personal identity and multilateral bargaining. His research has appeared in peer review journals such as the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Experimental Economics, Public Choice and Judgment and Decision Making, among others. Furthermore, in the last three years, he has managed the Nuffield CESS experimental laboratory. This experience has given him a deep knowledge of how experimental data are produced and analyzed. He has been coordinating a group of research assistants, and also been actively involved in other researchers’ projects, helping them to design, conduct and analyze experiments. Besides his academic achievements and research program, the practical knowledge that he has acquired should definitely contribute to the proposed research project.

**Hector Solaz**  Assistant to the Director 2011-2014

Before coming to CESS Hector was the Assistant Director of the LINEEX of the University of Valencia since 2009, and was previously a research fellow and research assistant at the LINEEX of the University of Valencia since 2007 and 2005 respectively. His PhD thesis and research focused on the area of experimental and behavioural economics to study social norms. He has earned some scholarships and grants in the field, including an Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation PhD scholarship 2007 - 2011, and an grant by the Valencian Government in Spain, for the study of industrial organization. He has attended the Graduate Student Seminar on Experimental Economics and Spontaneous Orders (George Mason University 2008) and the VII Mannheim Empirical Research Summer School (University of Mannheim 2007). He obtained his PhD at the University of Valencia in 2011. He completed his training visiting other centers, including the Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making.
(CREED), run by Prof. Van Winden, and the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, where he started new interdisciplinary research in the field of cognitive science joint with Prof. Brandts. As the Assistant to the Director of LINEEX, Hector has managed large grants coming from the National Science Foundation and the European Union. He has also regularly interacted with a wide variety of researchers, helping them running their experiments in the laboratory (including the design of experiments, software programming, and choice of procedures). In addition to that, he is familiar with the administrative protocols used to pay subjects and keep track of grants’ expenses. As a researcher his three main research fields nowadays are industrial organization, public economics, and behavioral economics. Hector has published his research in peer review journals such as Experimental Economics.

Michèle Belot  Research Fellow in Experimental Social Science

Currently a Research Fellow at Nuffield College (Centre for Experimental Social Sciences) Dr Belot joined the CESS in 2008 after four successful years as a Lecturer (with Tenure) at the Department of Economics in the University of Essex. Dr Belot obtained her Ph.D. in Economics from Tilburg University (CentER) in The Netherlands in 2003. As a “social and labour empirical economist” Dr Belot’s research is based on various types of data; from traditional surveys to non-standard field data and data collected through controlled experiments. Her main areas of interests revolve around labour and behavioural economics. Six research themes guide my work: Education and Health; Labour Market Institutions; Methodology; Migration; Social preferences; and Social ties. Her research has been published in journals such as Economic Journal, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Population Economics, or Economica and has resulted in wide coverage in the academic and public spheres.

Wojtek Przepiorka  Research Fellow in Experimental Social Sciences

Dr. Przepiorka is a postdoctoral researcher at Nuffield College, Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS), University of Oxford and the Department of Humanities and Social and Political Science at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH Zurich. He studied sociology, economics and computer science at University of Bern and obtained his doctorate in sociology at ETH Zurich in 2009. During his doctorate he attended workshops on applied statistics in Zurich, Essex and Ann Arbor. His research interests are in the evolution of social cooperation, social norms, behavioral game theory and experimental methods in the social sciences. In his current research, which circles around the topic of social cooperation in trust, public goods and common-pool resource settings, he works together with scholars from Switzerland, Germany, Poland, the US and the UK. In his research activities he receives financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation and the John Fell OUP Research Fund. He teaches a graduate course in experimental methods at University of Oxford and as a member of the CESS advises researchers in how to conduct laboratory experiments. He presents his research at international scientific conferences and publishes in peer-reviewed journals such as Rationality, Markets, and Morals, Zeitschrift für Soziologie and Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.

Iñaki Sagarzazu  Research Officer

Dr. Sagarzazu joined the Center for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) in 2010 as a Research Officer. Previously he was a Research Assistant at the University of Houston since 2006. He obtained his PhD in 2010 from the University of Houston. During his stay at the CESS Dr. Sagarzazu has been in charge of the coordination, programming, testing, and launching of online experiments and surveys. Furthermore, he has also been responsible for the analysis of the data collected via these online surveys. His major research interests are in
the areas of quantitative methods, comparative political institutions, and electoral behavior. His articles have appeared in leading international scientific journals. Recent publications have been published in the American Journal of Political Science, Latin American Politics & Society, Revista Latinoamericana de Politica Comparada, and America Latina Hoy.
CESS Infrastructure

During the last three years the CESS has devoted resources to have a state-of-the-art facility and a large and diverse subject pool to provide the best environment to meet the different needs of researchers interested in doing their experiments at CESS.

Lab Facilities

CESS Offices The CESS offices are located at 3 George Street Mews. It is an attractive location on the third floor and consists of:

- Experimental lab
- CESS seminar room
- Server room
- 4 offices of different sizes that host our staff and CESS visiting fellows

Computing Hardware The CESS offices are equipped with state-of-the-art experimental lab facilities that were supplied by HP Computers. Our current computing hardware profile is the following:

- 25 computer stations
- 2 servers
- laptop
- printer
- 3 desktop computers for staff and fellows

We have two servers: one is dedicated to the experiments conducted on the 25 computer work stations in the lab; the other is available for online experiments.

Subject Pool Recruitment

The CESS lab has been very successful at subject recruitment. The subject pool currently consists of a total of 3115 subjects. Table 1 provides a profile of the subject pool. The CESS subject pool is unusual in that it has a large concentration of non-student subjects: 35% are non-students. In fact, the CESS has devoted considerable effort to recruiting a diverse subject pool which we believe will differentiate the Centre from other experimental labs in the world.

Our student subject pool has been primarily recruited from Oxford University. Table 2 records our recruitment campaigns. This year, as well as funding a booth at the Oxford University Freshers Fair 2010 which was very successful, we also held a booth at Oxford Brookes University. Recruitment of subjects...
for the non-student pool is considerably more difficult. We have adopted a number of strategies such as advertising in local publications; recruiting from university employees; and directly recruiting from organizations.

Table 1: Participant Statistics

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of registered participants</td>
<td>3115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Students</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Female</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of experiment participations to date</td>
<td>6686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of people have participated at least once</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of people have participated more than once</td>
<td>1309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean turn-up rate</td>
<td>83.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Recruitment Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Brookes Fresher’s Fair</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford University Fresher’s Fair</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherwell Valley College</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Centre Plus</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout Enterprise</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lab Experiments

In the last academic year, the CESS lab has hosted fifteen lab experiments which needed over one hundred and fifty experimental sessions. They have involved researchers from economics, legal studies, political science, sociology and zoology. Similarly more than 2,200 participants took part of the experiments conducted at CESS. Essentially during term time the experimental lab facilities are being used at almost maximum capacity. Figure 2 illustrates the growth in demand for experimental sessions at CESS. The number of sessions in Michaelmas Term 2011 is 69, but it could easily go up to 90 at the end of the term.

Description of Lab Experiments

A brief description of some of these projects follows.

Comparing multi-unit auctions with complementarities. Daniel Marszałec
This experimental work studies multi-unit auctions where buyers demand multiple items and exhibit complementarities across units. When solving allocation problems, policymakers often care about efficiency, which measures whether the items are sold to those who value them most (rather than to those who bid most). The contribution of the experimental method is that we record all values, as well as bids - information that ‘real world’ data don’t have, but which is essential for assessing efficiency. The auctions compared in this work are: i) the first-price auction, charges each winning bidder the price that they bid. Here truthful bidding is not optimal. ii) The second is the Vickrey auction, which charges each winner a price that depends on bids of his rivals only - this encourages truthful bidding, but revenue may be low. iii) A Vickrey-Nearest Auction, introduced by Day & Milgrom (2008), minimises ‘total deviation incentives’ from truth telling, and was used by Ofcom for selling mobile spectrum in 2009. iv) Finally, a reference-rule auction, designed by Erdil & Klemperer (2010), minimises local (small) deviations, without increasing the total deviation incentives. This work is a first step in providing a broad overview of the kinds of conditions in which each of the four multi-unit auctions performs well, and thus offer insight for policymakers and practitioners.

Understanding Altruism towards Elderly Parents in an Experimental Laboratory Setting. Maria Porter, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. This project aims to understand to what extent adult children gain utility or happiness from their parents’ utility or happiness. Parents support young children because they love them. Yet, they also invest in children in the hope that they will support them in old age. But there is no commitment mechanism to enforce this “repayment”. So why do children support parents in old age? If families are altruistically linked, children would give less to parents who are less in need of help. In doing so, they can “undo” forced public transfers such as public pensions, the result being that such programs have no ultimate impact on parents’ well-being. But there are other motives: aversion to unfairness; the warm glow of giving - the utility one gets
simply from the act of giving without any concern for the interests of others; reciprocity - giving to generate or relieve an obligation; and an exchange of monies for services such as child care. Survey data alone does not allow us to distinguish between these different motivations.

No special predisposition to cooperation in humans. Stuart West and Max Burton-Chellew. Department of Zoology. University of Oxford. This experiment is the 4th and final in a series of experiments investigating the claim that Humans have a special predisposition to cooperate. There is a large empirical literature suggesting that when humans play anonymous one-shot economic games, in particular public-goods dilemma games, they cooperate more than would be expected from selfish interests. A highly influential body of research has argued that this behaviour of humans is due to a predisposition for cooperation that cannot be explained by existing evolutionary theory. However, this body of research is based on the implicit assumption that individuals behave perfectly in economic games, which can lead to biased conclusion. As the predicted behaviour is to contribute nothing to the public good, then any deviations from perfection (i.e. mistakes) are automatically perceived as greater than expected cooperation. Thus it is not possible to determine if participants are making mistakes (in the context of the game with the aim of maximising income) or whether they are using rules of thumb that evolved in ancestral environments and are “misfiring” in the context of the game. Here we empirically test between these competing alternative explanations. In order to distinguish between the above possibilities, we provide the appropriate control treatments, which were lacking from previous experiments, where imperfect behaviour is disassociated from leading to higher-than-predicted levels of cooperation.

Bargaining and Group Size. Luis Miller, CESS, Nuffield College and Christoph Vanberg, University of Heidelberg. We conduct a series of experiments to investigate the impact of different decision rules in groups of different sizes. Specifically, we investigate a bargaining situation in which groups of 3 and 9 participants must decide on a division of a surplus (approximately 10 pounds per person). Our experimental design is based on a theoretical model of group bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). A randomly chosen participant makes a proposal that is then voted on. We investigate the impact of two different rules for accepting the proposal: simple majority and unanimity. If a proposal is rejected, the surplus to be divided shrinks and a new proposer is chosen randomly. This process goes on until an agreement is reached. The central hypothesis to be tested is that unanimity leads to costly delays, especially in larger groups. If supported by the evidence, this would imply that larger groups should prefer lower majority requirements than smaller ones.

Cognitive Roots of Racial Homophily. Michèle Belot; Nuffield College and Edoardo Gallo, Nuffield College. The goal of the experiment is to shed light on the importance of cognitive limitations in the formation of social ties. The experiment extends the previous work by Michèle Belot on cognitive discrimination. The experiment has 2 parts. The first part is a memory task consisting of two short stages. In a first stage, participants will see a number of pictures of human faces (Caucasian whites and East-Asians). Each picture is coupled to a number corresponding to a random draw from a truncated normal distribution (mean is 50 and standard deviation is 15) - truncation at 10 and 90) - the number corresponds to value. In a second stage, participants will see the same pictures again, but without the associated value, and will be asked to select a number of pictures. Their earnings will depend on the number of pictures chosen and the values attached to the pictures (sum of values number of pictures x fixed cost per picture). Pictures will be randomly allocated to participants and
payoffs associated to pictures will also be randomly allocated for each participant. They have four treatments, varying the total number of pictures and the proportion of white faces. The second part of the experiment measures risk preferences using the strategy method. Participants will be asked to choose between lotteries and a fixed payment. One participant will be chosen at random and will earn an additional payment for this second part. The other participants will only earn a payment from the first part.

Inequality, Distributive Justice and the Individual. Luis Miller (Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences) and Abigail Barr (Queen Elizabeth House and Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences). What constitutes distributive justice in the minds of ordinary people? The philosophical literature offers several alternative principles of distributive justice. John Locke argued that people deserve to be rewarded in accordance with their efforts. John Rawls proposed that “undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for” (Rawls, 1971 p. 100). Robert Nozick (1974) argued that just distributions are merit-related or entitlement-based. But which of these, if any, do ordinary people adopt as the principle against which to judge their own and other people’s and entities’ outcomes and actions? Does the principle they apply vary systematically with their context? Are the poor more inclined towards the principles of Rawls and the relatively well off towards those of Locke or Nozick? What roles do their wider contexts their physical environments, livelihoods, and technologies play? What roles are played by experiences and actualities on the one hand and prospects, aspirations, and expectations on the other? And how mutable are individuals principles of distributive justice? Does an individual who finds him or herself in a position in a distribution that they perceive as personally unsatisfactory but socially just accept that position, act to redress the position despite its justness (and the corresponding unjustifiable nature of their actions) or revise their principle of justice, thereby rendering redress justifiable? In summary, we plan to comprehensively explore the notion that individual principles of distributive justice are endogenous.

Leadership, Followership, and Group Identity. Eric Dickson, New York University (and visiting CESS Fellow, Nuffield). I study the strategy and psychology of leadership and followership. In past work, I explore how “followers” do not necessarily fully take into account a leader’s strategic incentives to misrepresent the state of the world when sending messages to followers. As a result, followers’ posterior beliefs are biased away from the Bayesian benchmark in the direction of leaders’ communications. Here, I explore a new angle: whether inducing minimal group identities causes followers to “overbelieve” leaders’ messages to an even greater extent. In my new treatment, for which I attach the instructions, I induce minimal group identities using a standard (e.g., Tajfel et al) technique of grouping students based on their preferences over 20th century art. This new treatment will subsequently be compared to a “control treatment” involving the same protocol except that subjects will be randomly assigned to groups rather than being assigned via the minimal group paradigm. I also give subjects a post-experiment survey consisting of standard personality measures from social psychology, in an attempt to relate these to strategic behavior or patterns of belief formation.

The Emotional Voter. An Experimental Test of the Impact of Emotions on British Electoral Behaviour. Dr. Sara Hobolt, Lincoln College, University Of Oxford. The aim of this research project is twofold. First, to enhance our understanding of the ways in which electoral campaigns influence voting behaviour in Britain. Specifically, it aims to examine the role of emotions induced by electoral campaigns. Second, to develop,
extend and strengthen the theory of affective intelligence and voting behaviour. Broadly speaking, the theory of affective intelligence attributes different behavioural outcomes to the different types of emotions. For instance, enthusiasm is shown to be associated with the continued reliance on habitual activity, while anxiety is more prone to induce reason and, as such, decreasing ones reliance on prior party preferences. The project addresses the following questions: (1) What is the mechanism through which the content and phrasing of electoral messages influence the production of emotions? (2) What is the effect of different types of emotions (enthusiasm, anxiety) induced by electoral campaigns on turnout and vote choice in the context of British elections? (3) To what extent can the theory of affective intelligence be generalized beyond the American political and cultural context?

**The Appraisal Structure of Interest in Political Messages. Randy Stevenson, Rice University.** Experimental research on the emotional experience of interest has supported the idea that the emotional experience of interest in response to an event depends on two distinct cognitive appraisals: (1) how complex, novel, and uncertain is the event, and (2) how comprehensible is the event. Events that are appraised as high on both appraisal dimensions tend to produce interest. Existing experimental research has focused on events such as exposure to particular pieces of art, music, or poetry and has experimentally manipulated their complexity or their comprehensibility. The idea of these experiments is to apply similar experiments to political messages (the reception of which is the event to which the subject will respond).

**Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers. Raymond Duch (Nuffield College CESS), Wojtek Przepiorka (Nuffield College CESS), Randy Stevenson (Rice University).** The traditional view in the coalition government literature has been that both retrospective performance voting and prospective policy voting in complex coaliational systems founder on the high informational demands made on voters. Here we argue that voters are able to attribute responsibility to single decision makers for collective decision outcomes even within a multi-party governing coalition. Voters can attribute responsibility according to a party’s size (i.e. voting power), veto power, or agenda power. We conduct a laboratory and an internet survey experiment designed to tease out the heuristics subjects use in their responsibility attribution decisions. The lab experiment comprises a group dictator game with weighted voting power of the dictators and a punishment possibility for the recipients. Our results show that recipients punish unfair allocations and thereby mainly target the dictator with agenda power. We find rather weak evidence that dictators with veto power are targeted or that recipients engage in vote-proportional punishment. The survey experiment tests whether subjects indeed believe that the decision maker with agenda power has the most influence on the collective decision outcome. The results confirm this conjecture.
Internet Experiments

In 2010 the CESS began conducting virtual experiments. These are experiments in which the subjects are recruited to participate in experiments that are implemented on the CESS servers. These first experiments used the CESS subject pool and were designed to be similar to a conventional lab experiments – the major difference being that subjects did not have the need to physically come into the CESS lab facility. Beginning in August 2010 Iñaki Sagarzazu joined CESS as a Research Scholar in order to support this Internet experimental survey initiative.

National Representative Sample Internet Experiments

With the experience gained from the first Internet surveys carried out during the year 2009/2010, starting in 2011 the CESS began conducting large scale Internet experiments. These experiments programmed and hosted by CESS allow researchers to administer experiments to large-N samples drawn from national populations – typically in the range of 800-1,000 respondents. Researchers can also host lab and online versions of the same experiments. Table 3 summarises the Internet experiments conducted in the academic year 2010/2011.

Table 3: Internet Experiments - Trinity Term 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researchers</th>
<th>Institutional Affiliation</th>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Subject Pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ray Duch</td>
<td>Nuffield College</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Coalition reasoning</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>UK rep. sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Roberts</td>
<td>Nuffield College</td>
<td>Criminology</td>
<td>Jurisprudence</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>UK rep. sample</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The academic year 2011/2012 will see more of these large scale Internet experiments with the novelty that they do not need to restrict themselves to Oxford or the UK but could be done in any country in the world. Internet experimental modules are scheduled to be implemented in France prior to the 2012 Presidential elections (funded by the British Academy) and in the U.K in 2012 (funded by the Canadian SSHRC).
Research Papers Based on CESS Experiments


This study exploits the opening of the new experimental lab in Oxford to compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games. We find that students are more likely to behave as homo-economicus agents than non-students in games involving other-regarding preferences (Dictator Game, Trust Game and Public Good Game). These differences subsist even when controlling for differences in demographics, cognitive ability and risk preferences. In games that do not engage other-regarding preferences (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction) there is little evidence of differences in behaviour between subject pools. Also, in none of the five games is there evidence of significant differences in comprehension between students and non-students. Within subject analyses indicate that students are highly consistent in their other-regarding preferences while non-student subjects are much more inconsistent across other-regarding games. Most importantly, our findings suggest that experiments using students are likely to provide a lower bound estimate of other-regardedness in the general population while exaggerating the stability of other-regarding preferences.

Gill, D. and V. Prowse. 2009. A Novel Computerized Real Effort Task Based on Sliders. Mimeo

In this note, we present a novel computerized real effort task based on moving sliders across a screen which overcomes many of the drawbacks of existing real effort tasks. The task was first developed and used by us in Gill and Prowse (2009). We outline the design of our ‘task’, describe its advantages compared to existing real effort tasks and provide a statistical analysis of the behavior of subjects undertaking the task. We believe that the task will prove valuable to researchers in designing future real effort experiments, and to this end we provide z-Tree code and guidance to assist researchers wishing to implement the slider task.


In the last two decades, experimental papers on distributive justice have abounded. Two main results have been replicated. Firstly, there is a multiplicity of fairness rules. Secondly, fairness decisions differ depending on the context. This paper studies individual consistency in the use of fairness rules, as well as the structural factors that lead people to be inconsistent. We use a within-subject design, which allows us to compare individual behavior when the context changes. In line with the literature, we find a multiplicity of fairness rules. However, when we control
for consistency, the set of fairness rules is considerably smaller. Only selfishness and strict egalitarianism seem to survive the stricter requirement of consistency. We observe that this result is mainly explained by a self-serving bias. Participants select the rule that is individually optimal in each situation.


The behavioral economics literature on time discounting has suggested that individuals may systematically undersave when planning for retirement. Hence, pension systems have developed to enable, or indeed force, individuals to save more for retirement. Of course, the saving aspect and the timing of retirement are connected, in the sense that the expected length of retirement determines what is meant by adequate post-retirement resources, and vice versa. Despite this, the timing aspect rarely enters into policy discussions, although the same behavioural phenomena that lead to undersaving in this paper, myopia and present bias may also have implications for the retirement decision. Moreover, the form of pension payments may also affect the timing decision when individuals do not have time consistent preferences.

This paper presents a model of saving and retirement timing where saving rates are mandated, and pension payment may come in either a lump-sum or an annuity. It tests the model using data collected through a new experiment. The experiment presented has a particular novel feature which made it uniquely suited for testing the theoretical model. Specifically, participants in the experiment came back to the laboratory on a weekly basis over a two month period. This decision to return to the laboratory (or, to leave the experiment and collect a pension) became in itself the main variable of interest. The experiment therefore exploited the effort it takes for participants to come to the laboratory to capture preferences over time-use and leisure.

The results shown that plans over leaving the experiment tend not to reflect preferences, whilst actual leaving times were lower for more impulsive individuals and those who gave up more time to participate. This suggests a tradeoff between increasing saving through pension systems and earlier retirement. Payment group had no effect on retirement timing, most likely because the small rewards meant participants were indifferent between the two forms of payment. The results suggest individuals may have time-inconsistent preferences over leisure choices, leading to the incidences of unplanned early retirement.


Norm violations can be contagious. Previous research analyzed two mechanisms of why knowledge about others norm violations triggers its spread: (1) Actors lower their subjective beliefs about the probability or severity of punishment, or (2) they condition their compliance on others compliance. While earlier field studies could hardly disentangle both effects, we use a laboratory experiment which eliminated any punishment threat. Subjects (n = 466) could commit a violation of the honesty norm. They threw a die and were paid according to their reported number. Our design ruled out any possibility of personal identification so that subjects could lie about their thrown number and claim inflated payoffs without risking detection. The aggregate distribution of reported payoffs allowed determining the extent of liars in the population. Two treatments in which subjects were informed about lying behavior of others were compared to a control condition without information feedback. Distributions from a subsequent dice throw revealed that knowledge about liars triggered the spread of lying compared to the control condition. Our results demonstrate the contagiousness of norm violations, where actors imitate norm violations of others under the exclusion of strategic motives.

Abigail Barr, Justine Burns, Luis Miller, and Ingrid Shaw. 2011.
Individual notions of distributive justice and relative economic status.

We present two experiments designed to investigate whether individuals’ notions of distributive justice are associated with their relative (within-society) economic status. Each participant played a specially designed four-person dictator game under one of two treatments, under one initial endowments were earned, under the other they were randomly assigned. The first experiment was conducted in Oxford, United Kingdom, the second in Cape Town, South Africa. In both locations we found that relatively well-off individuals make allocations to others that reflect those others’ initial endowments more when those endowments were earned rather than random; among relatively poor individuals this was not the case.


The traditional view in the coalition government literature has been that both retrospective performance voting and prospective policy voting in complex coalitional systems founder on the high informational demands made on voters. Here we argue that voters are able to attribute responsibility to single decision makers for collective decision outcomes even within a multi-party governing coalition. Voters can attribute responsibility according to a party’s size (i.e. voting power), veto power, or agenda power. We conduct a laboratory and an internet survey experiment designed to tease out the heuristics subjects use in their responsibility attribution decisions. The lab experiment comprises a group dictator game with weighted voting power of the dictators and a punishment possibility for the recipients. Our results show that recipients punish unfair allocations and thereby mainly target the dictator with agenda power. We find rather weak evidence that dictators with veto power are targeted or that recipients engage in vote-proportional punishment. The survey experiment tests whether subjects indeed believe that the decision maker with agenda power has the most influence on the collective decision outcome. The results confirm this conjecture.

Raymond Duch (Nuffield College CESS) and Jean-Robert Tyran (University of Vienna). 2011. Coalition Context, Voter Heuristics and the Coalition-directed Vote.

In most democratic elections voters are faced with a choice between an incumbent coalition, composed of a number of parties, and an expectation that a similar or different group of parties could form a new governing coalition after the election. In contexts in which the election outcome is a multi-party governing coalition, the rational voter’s calculus takes into consideration what parties are likely to coalesce, the policies adopted by these potential coalition governments, and whether the voter is pivotal in electing any one of these permutations of “administrative responsibility”. We present evidence, from experiments and observational survey data collected in Denmark, Germany and the U.K., that voters actually engage in the kind of coalition reasoning that would allow them to attribute responsibility to the parties in a multi-party governing coalition and the anticipate the kinds of coalitions that form after an election. Overall levels of knowledge are conditioned on the complexity of the coalition context – on most indicators Denmark has the highest levels of political knowledge; Germany tends to fall in the middle; and Britain is consistently at the bottom. We find that context similarly conditions the sophistication of coalition reasoning in national electorates: There are four dimensions of coalition reasoning that we recover with experimental vignettes embedded in the British, Danish and German internet surveys: 1) voters understand the basic arithmetic of coalition formation – for example, they understand that two parties each with 30 percent of the legislative seats have sufficient voting strength in the legislature to form a viable coalition government; 2) voters anticipate the formation of minimum winning
coalitions – they think parties prefer coalitions that minimise the number of parties necessary to command a majority in the legislature; 3) voters recognise the fact that formateur status increases a party’s likelihood of entering the governing coalition; 4) voters reason in terms of the left-right ideological continuum so they anticipate parties that are proximate on the ideological scale will enter a coalition. The Danish electorate exhibits much more sophisticated coalition reasoning than is the case for the German electorate; and the British electorate has decidedly very low levels of coalition reasoning. We also demonstrate that our measure of sophisticated coalition reasoning predicts voting behaviour and that heterogeneity in these skills is negatively correlated with the contextual complexity of coalition formation and governance.

Raymond Duch (Nuffield College CESS) and David Armstrong (University of Milwaukee). 2011. “Risk Preferences and Vote Choice: Experimental Insights.”

This paper is concerned with understanding whether, and how, risk enters the voter calculus. It focuses on risk in spatial voting models but in subsequent work expect to explore the role of risk in a broader set of vote choice models. Second, it empirically estimates the distribution of risk preferences in the British population employing a measure of risk preference inspired by experiments conducted in lab settings. Third, it estimates the role of risk preferences in the vote decision replicating a recent effort by Berinsky and Lewis (2007) using data from the American NES. The empirical tests are conducted using internet panel surveys that are currently being conducted in the UK as part of the 2010 British Election (the British Cooperative Campaign Project that I will refer to as BCCAP).
Published Papers Based on CESS Experiments


We conduct an experiment to assess gender differences across different economic contexts. Specifically, we test whether women are more sensitive to the decision-making context in situations that demand the use of different fairness principles. We find that women adopt more often than men conditional fairness principles that require information about the context. Furthermore, while most men adopt only one decision principle, most women switch between multiple decision principles. These results complement and reinforce Croson and Gneezy’s organizing explanation of greater context sensitivity of women.


We conduct an experiment to assess the effects of different decision rules on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation. Specifically, we compare the amount of costly delay observed in an experimental bargaining game under majority and unanimity rule. Our main finding is that individual subjects are more likely to reject offers under unanimity rule. This increased rejection rate, as well as the requirement that all subjects agree, leads to more costly delay. This result provides empirical support for a classic argument in favor of less-than-unanimity decision rules put forth by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).


This paper develops a theoretical account of mass and elite evaluations of political ethics, which is tested on a new dataset from the United Kingdom. The analysis explores the extent of contemporary disagreement among British political elites and those they represent by comparing responses to questions asked in a representative survey of the public with similar questions asked of incumbent MPs and parliamentary candidates. The paper finds that there are systematic differences between members of the public, candidates and MPs at both aggregate and individual levels, differences which can be accounted for with reference to the framing effects of Parliament as an institution. Candidates for parliamentary office display significantly more tolerance of ethically dubious behaviour than other members of the public; within the elite category, elected MPs exhibit laxer ethical standards than those candidates who are unsuccessful.


We develop a novel computerized real effort task, based on moving sliders across a screen, to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a real effort sequential-move tournament. Our theory predicts that a disappointment averse agent, who is loss averse around her endogenous expectations-based reference point, responds negatively to her rival’s effort. We find significant evidence for this discouragement effect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population.

Dr Nicholas Allen and Dr Sarah Birch, “Political conduct and misconduct: probing public opinion”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 2011, 64(1): 61-81

The media and public response to the expenses scandal of 2009 has shown the enduring importance of standards of conduct in...
British public life. This article addresses some basic questions concerning citizens’ attitudes towards political wrongdoing, including how much notice people actually take of politicians’ misbehaviour, how much importance citizens attach to politicians’ integrity, and how big a problem in politics political misconduct is thought to be. Drawing on responses to a representative survey of the British public, the article finds that most people do take some notice of scandals, and that most people, when forced to choose, prize honesty in their politicians over competence. It also finds that these factors influence how big a problem certain types of behaviour are perceived to be.


The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.


Understanding the ultimate and proximate mechanisms that favour cooperation remains one of the greatest challenges in the biological and social sciences. A number of theoretical studies have suggested that competition between groups may have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation within human societies, and similar ideas have been discussed for other organisms, especially cooperative breeding vertebrates. However, there is a relative lack of empirical work testing these ideas. Our experiment found, in public goods games with humans, that when groups competed with other groups for financial rewards, individuals made larger contributions within their own groups. In such situations, participants were more likely to regard their group mates as collaborators rather than competitors. Variation in contribution among individuals, either with or without intergroup competition, was positively correlated with individuals’ propensity to regard group mates as collaborators. We found that the levels of both guilt and anger individuals experienced were a function of their own contributions and those of their group mates. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the level of cooperation can be influenced by proximate emotions, which vary with the degree of intergroup competition.
Seminar Series and Related Events

**Formal Experimental Seminar Series**
The CESS held nine Experimental Social Science Seminars during the 2010/2011 academic year. This is consistent with our goal is to have approximately four seminars in each of the Michaelmas and Hilary Terms and two seminars in Trinity Term. Table 4 provides a summary of the seminar speakers for the 2010/2011 academic year.

Table 4: CESS Experimental Seminar Series: 2010/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eleanor Maguire University College London</td>
<td>November 8, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Robert Tyran University of Vienna</td>
<td>November 19, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianne Bertrand Chicago Business School</td>
<td>November 26, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Karlan Yale University</td>
<td>December 16, 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Seabright Toulouse School of Economics</td>
<td>January 21, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tore Ellingsen Stockholm school of Economics</td>
<td>February 22, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa Bateson University of Newcastle</td>
<td>March 11, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin Camerer California Institute of Technology</td>
<td>May 17, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Morton New York University</td>
<td>June 21, 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Informal seminars and workshops 2010-2011**
The CESS also hosted a number of workshops on experimental design that are held in the CESS seminar room. The workshop is designed to allow prospective experimenters to present their experimental design and get feedback from interested faculty and students. Table 5 records the eleven informal seminars and workshops, along with their participants, that the CESS held in 2010-2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuffield College · 1 New Road · Oxford UK, 0X1 1NF</td>
<td><a href="mailto:cess@nuffield.ox.ac.uk">cess@nuffield.ox.ac.uk</a> · <a href="http://cess.nuff.ox.ac.uk/">http://cess.nuff.ox.ac.uk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Bang Petersen</td>
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<td>Craig Holmes</td>
<td>October 19, 2010</td>
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<td>Daniel Clarke</td>
<td>February 04, 2011</td>
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<td>Claire El Mouden</td>
<td>February 15, 2011</td>
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<td>Laura Levick</td>
<td>February 11, 2011</td>
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<td>Lucas Brown</td>
<td>February 18, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammara Mahmood</td>
<td>February 25, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mikhail Drugov</td>
<td>March 04, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon Haliday</td>
<td>May 06, 2011</td>
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<td>Diego Gambetta &amp; Wojtek Przepiorka</td>
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<td>Helen Margetts &amp; Peter John</td>
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<td>Ginger Turner</td>
<td>May 27, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nimi Hoffmann</td>
<td>June 10, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florian Artinger</td>
<td>June 17, 2011</td>
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Teaching

CESS Summer School. CESS had a number of successful teaching initiatives over the 2010/2011 period. Again this year the CESS Summer School in Experimental Methods in cooperation with the Essex Methods Summer School was very successful. This was the third Summer School held at Nuffield. This summer course lasted ten days and this year covered a more focused set of topics including: 1) the implementation of lab experiments and an introduction to Z-tree; 2) field experiments; 3) online experiments; 4) experimental design; and 5) experimental econometrics. Four CESS affiliated staff conducted most of the courses: Belot, Duch, Miller and Przepiorka. Dominik Hangartner (London School of Economics) taught the course on the analysis of experimental data (see appendix for the Summer School course description).

MPhil paper in Experimental Social Science Methods. CESS is providing teaching support for the Sociology MPhil course in experimental methods. This course is one of the two courses making up the Sociology MPhil paper, ‘Advanced Research Methods.’ The course covers the theoretical foundation and the practical aspects of a wide range of social science experiments, including lab-based, field-based and on-line experiments. This course has a maximum capacity of 25 students. Upon completion of the course, students should be able to: 1) formulate research questions that can be addressed using experiments; 2) design and carry out experiments, including programming experiments using appropriate softwares such as z-tree, work with the subject recruitment softwares, recruit subjects, and conduct experiments with subjects; 3) analyse and interpret results from social sciences experiment, draw appropriate causal inferences and understand related issues. The course was taught in Trinity Term 2011 on an experimental basis – the course has now received Division approval and will be offered as an eight-week lecture course in Trinity Term 2012 (see appendix for full course description).
Appendix I.- CESS Experiments 2010/2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researchers</th>
<th>Institutional affiliation</th>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
<th>Number of sessions</th>
<th>Number of subjects</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abigail Barr</td>
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<td>Int. Development</td>
<td>Distributive Justice Experiment</td>
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<td>John Fell Fund</td>
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<td>Sara Hobolt</td>
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<td>Zoology</td>
<td>Climate Change Experiment</td>
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<td>Sonia Macleod</td>
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<td>DNA Evidence</td>
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<td>Vincent Crawford,</td>
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<td>Economics</td>
<td>Auction Experiment 1</td>
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<td>Daniel Marzalec, and</td>
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<td>Victoria Crawford</td>
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<td>Randy Stevenson</td>
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<td>Puzzle Experiment Stevenson</td>
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Appendix II.- 2011 Essex/Nuffield CESS Experimental Summer School

2011 Essex/Nuffield CESS Experimental Summer School - Syllabus

Course Location

The Experimental Summer School will be held at the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) at Nuffield College Oxford. CESS has a fully-equipped experimental lab which will be an integral part of the Summer School instruction (http://cess-wb.nuff.ox.ac.uk/). All course lectures and lab sessions will be held at the Nuffield College CESS. Accommodation is available from the following Oxford Colleges:

- Nuffield College Standard Room £33 per day (unavailable June 29 to July 1st; includes breakfast; lunch/dinner at £60 for two week period paid in advance)
- Nuffield College Superior Room £46 per day (unavailable June 29 to July 1st; includes breakfast; lunch/dinner at £60 for two week period paid in advance)
- St. Peters en suite £55
- Worcester £68 (includes breakfast)
- St. Hildas Standard Room £54 (no meals)

Course Objectives

The objectives of the course are to provide researchers with all of the design, implementation, and analytic tools necessary for conducting an experimental research project. The course instructors all have extensive experience in designing and implementing field, lab, on-line physiological and neuro experiments. In addition, the course will take place at the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) which is a new facility and has a state-of-the-art lab facility; the neuro-experimental component of the course will have access to the Oxford’s extensive neuro-imaging equipment and facilities. The objective is to provide students with all of the theoretical foundations for designing, conducting and analyzing experiments but also to learn all of the implied applied aspects of implementing an experiment. For example, students will have an opportunity to implement a lab experiment including designing, programming the experiments in Z-Tree, working with the subject recruitment software, recruiting subjects, conducting the experiment with actual subjects, and analyzing the data.

This course is appropriate for students, from any discipline, who expect to include experimental research as part of their research agenda. It is also appropriate for students who want to become informed consumers of experimental research scholarship.
Course Prerequisites

Students should have a basic background in research design and basic statistics. For example, with respect to research design, they should understand such basic concepts such as exogeneity, control group, and confounding effects. And with respect to basic statistics they should understand the principals of ordinary least squares regression; how to calculate simple measures of association; and have some familiarity with a statistical software package.

Course Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27/6 Monday</td>
<td>Theory, Causal Inference and the Experimental Method</td>
<td>Wojtek Przepiorka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/6 Tuesday</td>
<td>Experimental Design with Applications</td>
<td>Michèle Belot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/6 Wednesday</td>
<td>Experimental Design with Applications</td>
<td>Michèle Belot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/6 Thursday</td>
<td>Conducting Lab Experiments</td>
<td>Luis Miller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7 Friday</td>
<td>Programming with Z-tree</td>
<td>Luis Miller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/7 Monday</td>
<td>Testing Theories in the Lab</td>
<td>Wojtek Przepiorka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7 Tuesday</td>
<td>Field Experiments</td>
<td>Michèle Belot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/7 Wednesday</td>
<td>Virtual Experiments</td>
<td>Raymond Duch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/7 Thursday</td>
<td>Experimental Approaches to Modeling and Data Analysis</td>
<td>Dominik Hangartner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/7 Friday</td>
<td>Experimental Approaches to Modeling and Data Analysis</td>
<td>Dominik Hangartner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Theme: Introduction to Experimental Design

Michèle Belot
Research Fellow Centre for Experimental Social Sciences
Research Interests: Labour and Behavioural Economics

Relevant References


Friedman, D. And Shyam Sunder (2002), Experimental Methods – A primer for Economists, Cambridge University Press


Fershtman, C. And U. Gneezy (2001), Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 35677
Theme: Lab Experiments and Z-Tree

Luis Miller

Postdoctoral Researcher Centre for Experimental Social Sciences

Research Interests: Experimental Social Science, Social Norms, Distributive Justice.

Relevant References


Webster, Murray and Jane Sell. 2007. Laboratory Experiments in the Social sciences. Elsevier.

Theme: Virtual Experiments

Raymond Duch
Professorial Fellow Nuffield College
Director of Centre for Experimental Social Sciences
Research Interests: Comparative Political Economy, Political Behaviour and Methods

Relevant References


Theme: Causal inference and theory testing in lab experiments

Wojtek Przepiorka
Postdoctoral Researcher Centre for Experimental Social Sciences
Research Interests: Evolution of Social Cooperation, Behavioral Game Theory, Experimental Methods in the Social Sciences

Relevant References


Theme: Experimental Approaches to Modeling and Data Analysis

Dominik Hangartner
Institute for Political Science, University of Bern, Switzerland
Research interests: Statistical methods, Research designs, and Political behaviour.

Relevant References


Appendix III.- Trinity Term 2011 Course on Experimental Social Sciences

Experimental Social Sciences - Syllabus

Course Provider:
Dr Wojtek Przepiorka (Nuffield, CESS)
wojtek.przepiorka@sociology.ox.ac.uk

Rubric: Designing, implementing, conducting and analysing social science experiments

Aims: The course covers the design, implementation, and analytic tools necessary for conducting social science experiments. Students will learn what research questions can be addressed using a wide range of experimental methods such as lab, field and on-line experiments. The objective is to provide students with the theoretical foundations for designing, implementing, conducting and analysing experiments, but also to learn the applied aspects of experimental social sciences.

Content and structure:
1. Causal inference and research designs
2. Experimental designs
3. Topics in experimental social sciences I
4. Topics in experimental social sciences II
5. Lab, field, survey and online experiments
6. Implementing a lab experiment: Basic considerations and software
7. Conducting a lab experiment
8. Analysing experimental data

Learning Outcomes: Upon completion of the course you should be able to (1) formulate research questions that can be addressed using experiments, (2) design and carry out experiments, including programming and subject recruitment, and (3) analyse and interpret results from social sciences experiments.

Teaching Arrangement: 8 two hour lectures (weeks 1-4), including two exercise sessions in the experimental laboratory at CESS.

Course Assessment: This course is assessed by an assignment of no more than 3,000 words that is due on Friday of week 10 of Trinity Term. In this assignment, students either carry out a secondary analysis of experimental data or develop an experimental design that addresses a new research question.
Key Texts:

