Dr. Luis Miguel Miller
Luis Miller joined CESS in September 2008. He did his PhD at the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (IESA-CSIC), and was previously a research associate at the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Germany). He has also been Visiting Scholar at the University of Essex (ECASS program) and at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (Indiana University, Bloomington). His main research interests are in analytical sociology and behavioural and experimental economics.
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CESS
Nuffield College
New Road
OX1 1NF
Oxford
Phone: +44 1865 614991
Email: Luis.Miller@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
SOME RECENT PAPERS
Promoting Justice by Treating People Unequally: An Experimental Study (with Alice Becker). Forthcoming, Experimental Economics.
Which inequalities among individuals are considered unjust? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study distributive choices dealing with arbitrarily unequal initial endowments. In a three-person distribution problem where subjects either know or do not know their endowments, we find impartial behavior to be a stable pattern. Subjects either compensate for initial inequalities fully or not at all in both conditions, and they do so more often when they do not know their endowment than when they know it. Moreover, the type and the size of the good to be distributed also affect the frequency of impartial behavior.
Personal identity. A theoretical and experimental analysis (with Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza and Maria Paz Espinosa). Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Methodology.
This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals' utility function when facing a Dictator Game decision is then presented. Finally, this "identity-based" utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allows us to study the main parameters of the model, suggesting that we should move with caution when attributing identities to individuals.
Conventions for Selecting Among Conventions - An Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis (with Susanne Buechner and Werner Gueth). Forthcoming, Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibrium play, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game with multiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordination often takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one has to coordinate on a prescribing principle of equilibrium selection. For the subclass of 2x2-bimatrix games with two strict equilibria we analyze the evolutionary stability of various such principles. In our experiment, we allow participants to first coordinate before playing various games. Based on between-subjects treatments, participants do this behind a complete (they know neither their role nor the game parameters), a partial (they know either their role or the game parameters) veil of ignorance, or with no ignorance (they know their role and the game parameters).
Are women expected to be more generous? (with Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Ramon Cobo-Reyes and Natalia Jimenez). Experimental Economics 12 (1): 93-98.
This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave differently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently. Moreover, while women believe that women are more generous, men consider that women are as generous as men.
Two notions of conventions: an experimental analysis. Journal of Institutional Economics 4: 327-349 (2008).
This paper aims at analyzing the interaction between both economic and sociological notions of convention. To this end, it starts by distinguishing conceptually between specific convention, i.e. an arbitrary but stable social regularity, and general convention, i.e. a principle of action prescribing how to behave in a certain class of situations. A game theoretical framework to represent the interrelation between both concepts is then introduced. Finally, this relation is studied experimentally. The main results of the experiment are: (1) general conventions have to be commonly known and adopted among subjects in order to work as guides to coordinate on specific conventions; (2) once subjects follow a general convention they are highly consistent with it in a repeated environment; (3) efficiency concerns are focal in the class of games studied in this paper.
Moral distance in dictator games (with Fernando Aguiar and Pablo Brañas-Garza). Judgment and Decision Making 3: 344–354 (2008).
We perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dictator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory.
COMING SOON
The Relationship Between External and Internal Validity (with Maria Jimenez-Buedo). Submitted.
Who should be called to the lab? A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games (with Michele Belot and Raymond Duch).
Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games (with Ana León-Mejía)
Instinctive response in the Ultimatum Game (with Pablo Brañas-Garza and Debrah Meloso)
WORK IN PROGRESS
Three versions of impartiality: ideal observer, real observer, stakeholder (with Fernando Aguiar and Alice Becker).
Values and behavioral tendencies among new labour market entrants in a time of economic crisis (with Abigail Barr and Paloma Ubeda)
